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Welfare Reform in Rural Minnesota
Experimental Findings from the Minnesota 
Family Investment Program
Lisa A. Gennetian, Cindy Redcross, and Cynthia Miller
Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation
Although issues of poverty affect families and children in both ur-
ban and rural areas of the United States, the plight of the urban poor
rings nearer for many researchers and caseworkers.  In fact, child and
adult poverty rates vary considerably across regions; they are highest in
highly urban areas (central cities) and in nonmetropolitan areas and
lowest in the suburbs.  A number of trends in the 1990s—declining wel-
fare caseloads, increased labor force participation among the poor, and
lessening child poverty—also varied substantially across regions (Rur-
al Policy Research Institute 1999).  Unlike patterns in urban areas,
caseload declines in rural areas have not run parallel with increases in
employment or reductions in poverty.  These trends in part reflect the
unique challenges that the poor and welfare recipients face in rural ar-
eas.  The most prominent are access to child care and transportation and
the availability and quality of employment opportunities. 
Despite these regional differences, the landmark 1996 welfare re-
form legislation (the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act, or PRWORA) treats eligibility and mandates for
welfare assistance in rural and urban areas alike.  The effects of this
legislation on rural, compared with urban, regions are not well under-
stood and are relatively understudied.  Fortunately, prior to the passage
of PRWORA, several states were granted federal waivers to implement
and test innovative welfare reform policies.  Using two years of follow-
up data, we examine the effects on employment and earnings among
rural, long-term recipients participating in one such experimental wel-
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fare waiver evaluation—the Minnesota Family Investment Program
(MFIP).  The MFIP evaluation included welfare recipients who resided
in both urban and rural counties, allowing a comparison of its effects
across a diverse cross-section of counties.  MFIP was first implemented
on a field trial basis in April 1994 in three urban counties of Hennepin
(Minneapolis), Anoka, and Dakota, and four rural counties, Mille Lacs,
Morrison, Sherburne, and Todd.
Recent findings show that MFIP had a range of positive effects on
long-term recipients, increasing parents’ employment, earnings, and in-
come and improving their children’s behavior and school performance
(Miller et al. 2000; Gennetian and Miller 2000).  The findings also
show, however, that MFIP’s effects for long-term recipients differed
somewhat for those in urban and rural counties.  In contrast to the large
and lasting employment and earnings increases in urban counties, aver-
age employment increases by the second year of follow-up were much
smaller for recipients in rural counties.  In addition, MFIP did not sig-
nificantly increase rural recipients’ average earnings. 
This chapter examines MFIP’s impact in rural and urban areas in
more detail and attempts to explain why the impacts were smaller in ru-
ral counties.  The research makes several contributions.  First, it adds to
emerging findings about the effects of welfare reform interventions on
single-parent families who are long-term welfare recipients.  Second,
the MFIP data provide a unique opportunity to examine the effects of
an identical intervention in two very different contexts—rural and ur-
ban areas.  Third, the wealth of detailed information about economic
and demographic characteristics and behavior allow an in-depth analy-
sis of why or how welfare reform interventions such as MFIP might
have different effects for urban and rural recipients.  Finally, perhaps
unlike many other experimental evaluations, these findings can inform
current state policy because the current statewide version of MFIP is
very similar to the program implemented for the evaluation.
We find that rural recipient families differ from urban recipient
families both in terms of their demographic characteristics and in their
work experience and attitudes or perceptions about welfare and work.
In particular, compared with urban recipients, more rural recipients are
white, more have been previously married, and more have recent work
experience prior to entering the evaluation.  Moreover, compared with
urban recipients, rural recipients are more likely to report a sense of
Chapter 10 289
stigma associated with receiving welfare.  These differences in observ-
able characteristics, particularly prior marital status and work experi-
ence, can explain a substantial part of the difference in effects for three
of the rural counties.  However, we also find that MFIP’s most negative
effects were confined to one particular rural county and that differences
in observable characteristics explain very little of the difference in this
county.  The differences in MFIP’s effects in this one county may be
due to aspects of the local economy that were unique to this county or
to unobservable differences between these recipients and recipients 
in other counties.  Nonetheless, the results highlight the role that re-
gional differences should play in formulating welfare and employment
policies.
THE MFIP MODEL AND EVALUATION
MFIP Model
MFIP integrated several programs in the Minnesota welfare sys-
tem.  These included Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), the core of the traditional system, and STRIDE, the state’s
employment and training program for AFDC recipients,1 which operat-
ed on a voluntary basis for certain targeted groups.  It also included the
state-run Family General Assistance program,2 which allowed some
low-income families to qualify for welfare who would not qualify un-
der AFDC.  MFIP also included the federally funded Food Stamp pro-
gram, which provided assistance in the form of coupons to be spent on
food.3 MFIP did not replace or change Medicaid, the federal-state
health program serving low-income families, which is available equal-
ly to recipients of MFIP and AFDC.
MFIP differed from the AFDC system in three fundamental ways.
First, MFIP made work pay for families receiving welfare.  This was
accomplished primarily by decreasing the extent to which families’
welfare grants were reduced when they went to work.  For a family on
AFDC, some earnings were disregarded when benefit amounts were
calculated, but benefits were still reduced substantially for each dollar
of earnings.  Under MFIP, much more of a family’s earnings were dis-
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regarded when determining benefit levels.  MFIP’s more generous dis-
regard ensured that working always resulted in more income than not
working.  For example, in 1994 a single parent with two children who
had no income from work received the same $769 in monthly welfare
benefits under MFIP or the AFDC system.  If she worked 20 hours per
week at $6 per hour, her grant was reduced by $237 less under MFIP
than it would have been under AFDC.  This raised the reward for work-
ing—the difference in total income between working and not work-
ing—from $255 to $492, or a 93 percent increase.  
MFIP child care payments also encouraged work because MFIP
paid child care expenses directly to the provider, leaving recipients
with no up-front costs.  AFDC recipients, in contrast, had to pay for
child care up-front, and those costs could be subtracted from their in-
come when their AFDC grant was calculated.  Although AFDC recipi-
ents were eventually reimbursed for child care expenses, this process
could take up to two months.
The second way MFIP varied from AFDC was that MFIP required
long-term public assistance recipients to participate in employment and
training services.  Under MFIP, single parents who had received public
assistance for 24 of the prior 36 months were required to participate in
employment and training activities in order to continue receiving their
full grants.  Individuals were exempt from participating if they had a
child under the age of 1, if they had other “good cause” reasons, or if
they were working at least 30 hours per week.
For single-parent families, MFIP’s employment and training ser-
vices were a substitute for those provided under AFDC through the
STRIDE program.  MFIP differed from STRIDE in two significant
ways: STRIDE was essentially a voluntary program and had a strong
focus on education and training, whereas MFIP was mandatory for
long-term recipients and placed greater emphasis on rapid entry into
employment.
Finally, MFIP consolidated benefits and streamlined public assis-
tance rules and procedures.  MFIP combined the benefits of AFDC,
Family General Assistance, and food stamps into a single program;
therefore, families on MFIP encounter a single set of rules and proce-
dures.  In addition, recipients received food stamp benefits as part of
their cash assistance grant instead of separately as coupons (as they did
under the AFDC system). 
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Minnesota implemented a revised version of MFIP in January 1998
in response to new flexibility under federal Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF) rules.  The many similarities between the orig-
inal MFIP program and statewide MFIP make the evaluation results a
good starting point for predicting the likely results of statewide MFIP,
even though the changes in the program make it difficult to make such
predictions with accuracy.  The biggest policy changes in the new pro-
gram are aimed at reducing costs and increasing the urgency of the em-
ployment message.  These include the five-year time limit, the reduced
basic grant, the reduced earnings threshold for leaving welfare, the
more immediate participation mandate, tighter sanctions, and the in-
creased orientation toward full-time work. 
The statewide program may exhibit other strengths and weakness-
es relative to the field trials, which is true of many programs that move
from an experiment to a wider application.  On the one hand, the results
presented here may be more favorable than would be the case in a
statewide program because each county in the statewide program will
probably receive less intensive “hand-holding” by state staff than was
true in the field trials.  Also, staff may be less enthusiastic than the staff
in counties that volunteered to participate in the field trials.  In addition,
as more welfare recipients are subject to work requirements, any em-
ployment effects that resulted from “jumping the queue” of employ-
ment over other workers may be more difficult to achieve as more
workers become subject to the same requirements.  On the other hand,
the new program has the advantage of potential “community effects,”
or change in community norms that will occur now that MFIP is satu-
rating the entire state caseload rather than affecting just a subset of fam-
ilies within particular counties. 
The MFIP Evaluation
The MFIP field trials began in 1994 and included single-parent and
two-parent families in seven urban and rural counties in central Min-
nesota.4 Random assignment began in April 1994 and concluded in
March 1996, after a total of 14,639 families had entered the research
sample.  Welfare recipients already on the AFDC caseload were ran-
domly assigned when they reapplied for assistance.  At this time, sin-
gle-parent families in urban and rural counties could be assigned to one
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of two research groups—the MFIP group or the AFDC group.5 All sin-
gle-parent families assigned to the MFIP group received the full MFIP
program.  This included MFIP’s benefit structure, its financial incen-
tives, and, once they had received public assistance for 24 of the prior
36 months, the requirement to participate in MFIP’s employment and
training services.  Single-parent families assigned to the AFDC group
were eligible for the benefits and services offered by Minnesota’s
AFDC system.  They were subject to the financial rules of the AFDC
and Food Stamp programs,6 and, if in a STRIDE target group, they
were eligible to volunteer for STRIDE services. 
DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE CHARACTERISTICS
There are two main samples in the MFIP evaluation—the full eval-
uation sample and a smaller survey sample that was interviewed three
years after random assignment.  Administrative data are available for
two-and-one-half years after random assignment for the full evaluation
sample.  The administrative data include public assistance benefit
records provided by Minnesota’s Department of Human Services and
unemployment insurance records provided by Minnesota’s Department
of Economic Security.  These data are used to construct average quar-
terly measures of employment, earnings, and welfare receipt.  A client
survey was administered approximately three years after random as-
signment, collecting information about the characteristics of employ-
ment, family structure, and a number of other measures of family well-
being.
As noted, we focus here on long-term recipients, defined as single-
parent families that have received welfare for 24 months or more at the
time of random assignment.  The primary reason for defining long-term
recipients in this way is because these families were required to partic-
ipate in employment services if they did not already work at least 30
hours per week.  The sample used here includes 2,373 single-parent re-
cipient families—1,780 urban and 593 rural—for which administrative
data are available, and 976 single-parent recipient families—724 urban
and 252 rural—with survey data.7
Table 10.1 presents descriptive characteristics by area of residence
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Table 10.1  Selected County and Single-Parent-Family Characteristics in






White, non-Hispanic 43.4 92.3 55.7*
Black, non-Hispanic 41.9 0.7 31.6
Hispanic 2.1 0.3 1.7
Native American/Alaskan/Asian 12.6 6.7 11.1
Average age (yr.) 30.1 31.5 30.8
Family structure (%)
Never married 68.4 44.6 62.5*
Youngest child under 6, or client pregnant
at the time of random assignment 65.5 60.6 64.3*
Labor force status (%)
Worked full-time for 6 months or more for
one employer 51.4 64.0 54.5*
Any earnings in past 12 months 15.0 21.1 16.5
High school diploma or GED 66.9 71.7 68.1*
Received AFDC for 5 years or more 55.9 45.7 53.3*
Lives in public/subsidized housing 43.4 37.3 41.8*
Currently enrolled in education or training 22.7 24.8 23.2
Average unemployment rate, 1997a (%) 2.3 6.3 4.3
Employment by industry, 1990a (%)
Agriculture 1.0 10.9 6.0
Manufacturing 20.5 20.3 20.4
Wholesale/retail trade 22.8 19.4 21.1
All other 55.7 49.4 52.6
Sample size (total = 2,373) 1,780 593 2,373
NOTE: The sample includes AFDC and MFIP group members who were randomly as-
signed from April 1, 1994, to March 31, 1996.  An asterisk (*) denotes that the dif-
ferences between urban and rural counties on this characteristic are statistically sig-
nificant at the 10% level.  The box in the ethnicity category indicates the overall
significance of ethnicity. 
a Calculated using data from the City and County Data Book, and the 1990 Census,
“USA Counties.”  These data were calculated using unweighted averages of the rele-
vant county statistics.  The differences in these characteristics were not tested for sta-
tistical significance.
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from the Background Information Form
(BIF).
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for single-parent recipients.8 The data used to calculate these descrip-
tive characteristics come from a baseline information form that each
parent completed at the time of random assignment.  The majority of
the sample was white, most were never married, most had some work
experience, and over half had been on welfare for five or more years
when they entered the evaluation.9 The MFIP evaluation sample, as a
whole, looks quite similar to the Minnesota caseload in 1994, with the
exception that a slightly lower proportion of the evaluation sample was
white.  However, a depiction of the national welfare caseload in 1994
shows that the MFIP sample, compared with recipients in other states,
had a higher proportion of white families and a lower proportion of
Hispanic families, and recipients had higher levels of education (U.S.
House of Representatives 1996).
Urban and rural single-parent recipients were different in a number
of ways.  (Significant differences are indicated by an asterisk in Table
10.1.)  Approximately 81 percent of the urban recipients lived in Hen-
nepin County, which includes Minneapolis (data not shown); 43 per-
cent were white, and 68 percent were never married.  In contrast, 92
percent of the rural recipients were white and 45 percent were never
married.  Parents in rural counties appear better prepared to enter the
workforce; 64 percent had worked full-time at some point, and 21 per-
cent had worked in the year prior to random assignment, whereas about
15 percent of urban recipients had recent work experience.  Recipients
in rural counties were also more likely than urban recipients to have
completed some kind of secondary education.  For example, rural re-
cipients were 5 percentage points more likely than urban recipients to
have a high school diploma.  Local environments also differed.  The ru-
ral areas had higher unemployment rates in 1997 and relatively more
employment in the agricultural sector. 
Table 10.2 presents information about recipients’ attitudes and
opinions on work and welfare based on data from a Private Opinion
Survey administered at the time of random assignment.  Although a
large majority of the sample reports a preference to work part-time or
full-time (not shown), a majority also report at least one barrier to part-
time employment, including child care, transportation, and health and
emotional problems.  Many respondents report being ashamed of being
on welfare and that people looked down on them for being on welfare,
yet most still believe that welfare provided better income than work. 
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Table 10.2  Selected Attitudes and Opinions of Single-Parent Sample




Client-reported barriers to employment (among
those not currently employed, those who agreed
or agreed a lot that they could not work part-
timea right now for the following reasons)
No way to get there every day 45.9 39.6 44.2*
Cannot arrange for child care 53.8 37.8 49.6*
A health or emotional problem, or a family
member with a health or emotional problem
26.2 29.9 27.2
Too many family problems 25.2 23.1 24.6
Already have too much to do during the day 23.1 25.8 23.8
Any of the above five reasons 79.5 74.0 78.0*
Client-reported attitudes toward welfare (those who
agreed or agreed a lot with the following
statements)
I feel that people look down on me for being on
welfare
63.3 75.1 66.5*
I am ashamed to admit to people that I am on
welfare
54.1 67.8 57.7*
Right now, being on welfare provides for my
family better than I could by working
58.8 68.9 61.5*
I think it is better for my family that I stay on
welfare than work at a job
17.7 22.2 18.9*
Client-reported social support network (those who
agreed or agreed a lot with the following
statements)
Among my family, friends, and neighbors, I am
one of the only people who is on welfare
34.4 42.1 36.4*
When I have trouble or need help, I have
someone to talk to
75.0 83.1 77.2*
Client-reported sense of efficacy (those who agreed
or agreed a lot with the following statements)
I have little control over the things that happen to
me 
21.5 19.5 20.9
I often feel angry that people like me never have
a chance to succeed
49.4 46.9 48.8
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Sometimes I feel that I’m being pushed around in
life
42.2 51.2 44.6*
There is little I can do to change many of the
important things in my life
33.4 30.8 32.7
All of the above 7.9 9.5 8.4
None of the above 28.5 27.0 28.1
Sample size (total = 2,373) 1,780 593 2,373
NOTE: The sample includes AFDC and MFIP group members who were randomly as-
signed from April 1, 1994, to March 31, 1996.  Twenty-seven percent of single-par-
ent sample members did not fill out a Private Opinion Survey because the survey be-
gan in the second month after the start of random assignment.  An asterisk (*)
denotes that the differences between urban and rural counties on this measure are
statistically significant at the 10% level.
a Part-time is defined as a minimum of 10 hours per week and less than 40 hours per
week.
These attitudes and perceptions differ considerably among urban
and rural recipients.  It is particularly striking that, compared with ur-
ban recipients, rural recipients are much more likely to perceive stigma
associated with welfare; that is, they are ashamed to admit being on
welfare.  Yet, at the same time, those in rural counties were more likely
to agree that welfare provides a better alternative than work.  The other
striking difference is that rural recipients were less likely than urban re-
cipients to report a barrier to part-time work.  In particular, rural recipi-
ents were more than 6 percentage points less likely to report transporta-
tion as a barrier to part-time employment and 16 percentage points less
likely to report child care as a barrier.  Shelton et al. (in this volume, p.
345) also found that urban recipients report child care as a barrier to
work more often than rural recipients. 
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EXPECTED EFFECTS AND BASIC 
EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION
Expected Effects
Both of MFIP’s primary components—enhanced financial incen-
tives and mandatory employment-focused activities—should affect
parents’ employment decisions, although not always in the same way.
When thinking about their effects, it is helpful to consider what parents
would have done in the absence of the program.  As an extreme exam-
ple, if all people receiving welfare in Minnesota typically went to work
soon after they started receiving benefits, the program would have no
effect on employment rates.  In reality, however, some parents return to
work quickly, some after several months, and others do not work.
The mandatory employment and training activities were purpose-
fully targeted to parents who had remained on welfare for a long period
without working, or parents who would not have worked in the absence
of MFIP.  By requiring that they participate in case management and
employment activities if not employed at least 30 hours per week, the
mandates should increase full-time employment.  By increasing full-
time employment, the mandates should decrease welfare receipt.  The
mandates will have little effect on people who would have worked full-
time anyway. 
Financial incentives have somewhat different expected effects.  A
single parent can obtain a higher total income under MFIP than AFDC
if she works either part-time or full-time.  For parents who would not
have worked under AFDC, MFIP should increase their incentive to find
a job. MFIP’s incentives were relatively more generous for part-time
work.  Thus, parents who go to work may be more likely to take a part-
time than a full-time job.
Some parents, however, would have returned to work in the ab-
sence of MFIP.  Providing them with more generous benefits will not
affect their decision about getting a job, but it may affect the intensity
of their work effort.  Consider a parent working 30 hours per week.
MFIP provides her with higher benefits than she could have obtained
under AFDC and, therefore, higher total income.  If she cut back her
work hours, substituting welfare benefits for earnings, she could re-
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ceive the same total income as she would have received under AFDC
but with less work.  Note that she will not be encouraged to leave her
job because MFIP’s more generous benefits are only provided to par-
ents who work.  In contrast, because she can keep more of her benefits
under MFIP compared with AFDC, as her earnings rise, she may be en-
couraged to increase her earnings further by increasing the number of
hours worked.  Thus, for parents who would have worked in the ab-
sence of MFIP, its incentives may either increase or decrease work in-
tensity, depending on which of these two effects dominates. 
For those who would not have worked in the absence of MFIP, the
incentives should increase employment.  MFIP may produce large in-
creases in part-time employment, however, because its incentives are
more generous for part-time work.  The incentives should also increase
welfare receipt, at least in the short term, given that they allow families
that earn more to still receive some benefits. 
How do we expect MFIP’s effects to differ in urban and rural coun-
ties given the differences in characteristics previously noted?  On the
one hand, because rural recipients have more recent work experience
and more of a sense of welfare stigma, they generally may be more
likely to go to work in the absence of MFIP.  In this case, we would ex-
pect MFIP to have less of an effect on their employment and earnings
compared with urban recipients.  On the other hand, MFIP’s participa-
tion requirements may be more effective for a group of welfare recipi-
ents who are better prepared to work, such as the rural recipients, and,
in this case, MFIP may have a more positive effect on rural recipients
compared with urban recipients.
Basic Empirical Estimation
To evaluate the effects of MFIP relative to the AFDC system, re-
cipients were randomly assigned to either the AFDC system or the
MFIP system.  Random assignment provides a powerful tool for esti-
mating program effects.  Because sample members were assigned ran-
domly in a lottery-like process, the characteristics of individuals in
each research group should not differ systematically at the time of ran-
dom assignment, known as “baseline.”  Therefore, any significant dif-
ferences in outcomes between these research groups can be attributed
to the program, and a comparison of the outcomes for families assigned
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to each group provides a reliable estimate of MFIP’s impact.10 Because
changes in employment and earnings somewhat mirror changes in the
receipt of welfare or the amount of welfare payments, the focus of this
study is on earnings and employment rather than welfare receipt or
payments.  A unique feature of the MFIP evaluation is that both rural
and urban counties were included in the evaluation.  To assess whether
MFIP’s effects differed by region, the impact was estimated separately
for recipients in urban counties and rural counties.
IMPACTS IN RURAL AND URBAN COUNTIES
Figure 10.1 presents MFIP’s impact on quarterly employment and
earnings for two years after random assignment.  The results are based
on administrative data on employment from unemployment insurance
records.  Average quarterly employment rates for the MFIP and AFDC
groups in the urban counties (left panel of Figure 10.1) both increased
steadily over the follow-up period.  Rates for the MFIP group, howev-
er, increased at a faster rate than their AFDC counterparts.  In quarter
five, for example, 49.6 percent of the MFIP group was employed com-
pared with 33.1 percent of the AFDC group.  MFIP increased employ-
ment an average of 13–14 percentage points per quarter throughout the
two-year follow-up. 
MFIP’s effects on earnings in urban areas are similar to its effects
on employment.  Both groups see an increase in average earnings
throughout the follow-up period, and the increase is larger and faster
for members of the MFIP group.  These results persisted throughout the
follow-up period.
MFIP’s effects on earnings and employment in the rural counties
(right panel, Figure 10.1) show that, as with urban counties, average
employment and earnings for the MFIP and AFDC groups increased
throughout the follow-up period.  However, average employment rates
increased faster for the MFIP group in earlier quarters.  In later quarters
(corresponding to the second year of follow-up), the difference in em-
ployment rates for the AFDC and MFIP groups decreased somewhat,
and the AFDC group began to catch up with the MFIP group.  Average
employment rates for the MFIP group were nearly 12 percentage points
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SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from Minnesota’s unemployment insurance
(UI) earnings records.
Figure 10.1  Quarterly Employment and Earnings for Long-Term 
Recipients in Urban and Rural Counties
higher than the AFDC group in the first five quarters.  By quarter six,
the difference in employment rates between the MFIP and AFDC group
was only 6 percentage points and no longer significant. 
The effects of MFIP on average earnings follow a similar pattern.
In fact, in later quarters, the MFIP group had lower earnings on average
than the AFDC group despite having somewhat higher employment
rates (Figure 10.1, bottom right panel).  Positive effects on employment
rates without positive effects on earnings suggests that some parents in
the MFIP group who would have worked anyway reduced their hours
worked.  As noted earlier, this is one of the potential effects of en-
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hanced financial incentives.  Although not shown, MFIP increased in-
come (measured from welfare and earnings) for recipients in urban and
rural counties.  However, income increases for urban recipients were
both from more earnings and more welfare income, whereas income in-
creases for rural recipients derived primarily from more welfare in-
come.  MFIP’s effects on annual employment and welfare receipt are
presented in Table 10.3. The types of jobs rural recipients obtained
were also somewhat different from those of their urban counterparts
(Table 10.4). Although there are some differences in impacts, the data
highlight differences in the types of jobs recipients secure in rural and
urban areas.  A comparison of the two AFDC groups, for example,
shows that although more rural recipients reported working during the
period, more of them were working part-time.  In addition, their wages
were lower on average—a higher fraction of rural workers earned
$5–$7 per hour.
Looking in more detail at the effects in the rural counties, Figure
10.2 presents MFIP’s impacts on earnings for each individual rural
county, using administrative records data for the full sample.  Because
the sample sizes for each individual county are fairly small, none of the
effects are statistically significant.  Nonetheless, the figure shows that
the impacts are smaller in the rural counties when grouped together
largely because of MFIP’s negative effects in Sherburne County.  The
pattern in Sherburne County indicates that, in the first five quarters,
MFIP increased earnings, but in quarter six, the pattern changes, and
MFIP actually lowered earnings in later quarters.  MFIP’s effects in
Sherburne County, however, do not explain the entire story.  The effects
in the other three rural counties are also, on average, smaller than those
in the urban counties.
Part of the explanation for the different impacts in Sherburne
County may be that employment and earnings were very high for the
AFDC group; although not shown, 55 percent of the AFDC group
worked in each quarter, compared with only 33 percent to 43 percent in
the other counties.  Programs typically have a more difficult time in-
creasing employment when so many of the participants would have
worked anyway.  Also, as mentioned earlier, MFIP’s financial incen-
tives might reduce earnings on average for recipients who would have






Table 10.3  Summary of MFIP’s Impacts on Employment and Welfare for Single-Parent, Long-Term
Recipients in Urban and Rural Counties







Average quarterly employment (%)
Year 1 46.0 32.8 13.3*** 43.8 32.0 11.8***
Year 2 53.2 39.3 13.9*** 50.3 44.5 5.8*
Average quarterly earnings ($)
Year 1 699 537 163*** 665 536 128
Year 2 1,129 913 216*** 1,002 1,019 –17
Welfare receipta
Average quarterly receipt rate (%)
Year 1 92.4 90.7 1.7* 92.8 87.6 5.2**
Year 2 81.0 75.7 5.3*** 81.9 69.5 12.4***
Average quarterly benefit ($)
Year 1 1,964 1,810 154*** 1,915 1,646 269***
Year 2 1,627 1,484 143*** 1,583 1,192 391***
Sample size (total = 2,373) 846 934 295 298
NOTE: The sample includes members randomly assigned from April 1, 1994, to March 31, 1996, excluding the small percent-
age who were receiving or applying only for food stamps at random assignment.  A two-tailed t-test is applied to regression-
adjusted impact estimates.  Statistical significance levels are indicated as *** = 1%; ** = 5%; * = 10%.
a Welfare receipt is defined as receipt of either food stamp coupons or cash benefits from AFDC, Family General Assistance, or
MFIP.  Average welfare benefits are the sum of benefits from any of these sources.
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from Minnesota’s unemployment insurance (UI) earnings records and public assis-
tance benefit records.
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hours.  This type of effect was found in the urban counties for recent
applicants and for a subgroup of long-term recipients with recent work
experience (see Miller et al. 2000).
Further analysis showed that Sherburne County differed from the
other rural counties in a number of ways, one being its lower unem-
ployment rate.  Although all of the rural counties are concentrated in
the eastern part of the state, Sherburne County is closest to the urban ar-
eas, bordering Anoka County.  In general, rural counties that were close
to urban areas may have experienced faster job growth during the early
1990s than more remote rural areas (Conoway 1998).  In a separate
chapter in this volume, McKernan et al. (p. 257) also found that among
rural counties, employment opportunities were better if the county 
was adjacent to a metropolitan area.  Recipients in Sherburne County
also differed in many ways from recipients in the other three rural
counties.  Although the data are not shown, Sherburne County recipi-
ents were somewhat younger on average, were more likely to be white,
and were more likely to have children under age 6 when they entered
the study. 
In terms of employment prospects, recipients in Sherburne County
were more likely than other rural recipients to have had recent work ex-
perience and more had obtained a high school diploma or a higher de-
gree.  They were also much more likely to have been enrolled in educa-
tion or training (primarily vocational education and skills training) at
the time of random assignment.  All of these differences are consistent
with the fact that the AFDC group in Sherburne County had much high-
er employment rates and average earnings than the AFDC groups in the
other three counties (Figure 10.2).  Recipients in Sherburne County
were also more likely to perceive stigma associated with welfare com-
pared with their rural counterparts, and they were more likely to report
transportation and child care as barriers to employment.
In summary, MFIP increased employment in both urban and rural
counties.  However, in contrast to the large and lasting employment in-
creases in urban counties, MFIP’s effects faded considerably by the
second year in the rural areas.  Much of the difference for the rural
counties is driven by MFIP’s effects in Sherburne County.  However,
MFIP’s effects in the other three counties are still, on average, smaller






Table 10.4  MFIP’s Impact on Household Composition, Marital Status, and Characteristic of Current or
Most Recent Job for Long-Term Recipients in Rural and Urban Counties






For most recent or current job (%)
Worked since random assignment 85.2 73.7 11.6*** 86.7 82.2 4.5
Part-time (less than 30 hr.) 22.3 18.1 4.2 28.4 24.4 4.0
Full-time (more than 30 hr.) 62.8 54.8 8.0** 58.3 57.8 0.5
Wage rate
Less than $5 5.3 6.6 –1.4 7.5 7.1 0.4
$5 to $6.99 22.2 17.5 4.7 32.6 33.6 –1.0
$7 to $8.99 32.8 25.9 6.9** 31.2 24.5 6.7
$9 or above 23.5 21.5 2.0 13.0 14.9 –1.9
Health benefits 42.2 33.6 8.6** 31.2 34.3 –3.1
No health benefits 42.4 39.7 2.7 53.9 46.8 7.1
Household composition
Size of household 3.7 3.7 0.0 3.9 3.8 0.1
Living with related adults (%) 10.7 13.3 –2.7 7.8 7.7 0.2





Currently married 8.6 5.8 2.8 23.4 15.6 7.9
Divorced/separated 27.1 29.0 –2.0 28.3 32.8 –4.6
Never married 47.3 49.3 –2.0 26.0 27.7 –1.7
Currently cohabiting 15.3 14.8 0.6 20.2 22.8 –2.6
Currently married or living with partner 23.9 20.8 3.2 43.6 38.4 5.3
Household sources of income (%)
Respondent earnings 54.6 52.8 1.8 72.2 60.8 11.4*
Other household earnings 24.3 28.8 –4.5 46.9 46.0 0.9
Child support 14.5 19.3 –4.8* 32.4 31.9 0.4
Public assistance 65.1 59.7 5.4 51.0 51.9 –0.8
Other 19.1 19.1 –0.1 16.5 21.5 –4.9
Sample size (total = 976) 372 352 116 136
NOTE: The sample includes members randomly assigned from April 1, 1994, to March 31, 1996, excluding the small percent-
age who were receiving or applying only for food stamps at random assignment.  A two-tailed t-test is applied to regression-
adjusted impact estimates.  Statistical significance levels are indicated as *** = 1 percent; ** = 5 percent; * = 10 percent.
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from Minnesota’s unemployment insurance (UI) earnings records and public assis-
tance benefit records and the 36-month survey.
306 Gennetian, Redcross, and Miller
DISCUSSION
There are a number of possible reasons why the effects of MFIP
differed in rural and urban counties.  First, the recipients themselves
may differ in ways that are related to how they are affected by the pro-
gram.  As previously discussed, urban and rural recipients differ across
a range of demographic characteristics and thus may have been affect-
ed by the program differently.  It is easy to imagine, for example, that
MFIP might have smaller effects on recipients who had recent work ex-
perience, given that many would probably have worked in the absence
SOURCE: MDRC calculations using data from Minnesota’s unemployment insurance
(UI) earnings records.
Figure 10.2  Quarterly Earnings for Long-Term Recipients 
in Rural Counties
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of the program.  If rural recipients, on average, were more employable
than their urban counterparts, MFIP might have smaller effects in rural
areas.  Further statistical analysis showed that, for the three rural coun-
ties (excluding Sherburne County), marital status, prior work experi-
ence, and child care problems explain much of the difference in MFIP’s
effects in rural and urban counties. 
It is easy to understand why the program’s effects might differ by
prior employment status, given that employment effects are likely to be
smaller among those who would have worked anyway.  But why would
its effects vary by prior marital status?  One hypothesis is that rural re-
cipients who are more likely to have been previously married may also
be more likely to receive child support income.  This, in turn, may al-
low them to rely less on their own earnings.  For example, previously
married, rural welfare recipients may be more likely than their urban
counterparts to cut back on work both because they have the safety net
of MFIP’s additional benefits and because they receive child support
income.  Table 10.4 offers some support for this hypothesis.  Rural re-
cipients in both the MFIP and control groups are nearly twice as likely
to receive child support income in the month prior to the survey com-
pared with urban recipients. 
An alternative hypothesis is that prior marital status is a good pre-
dictor of the likelihood of remarriage or cohabitation during the follow-
up period, which, in turn, may affect individual work effort.  Although
not shown, the survey data revealed that previously married women
were more likely than never-married women to be formally married by
the end of the third year, but they were not more likely to be cohabiting
(either formally married or living with a partner), with the exception of
Sherburne County.  In addition, recipients in rural areas were more
likely to be married or coupled than urban recipients, regardless of their
prior marital status. 
Another possible reason for the different effects is that MFIP may
have affected other aspects of family life differently in urban and rural
areas, which, in turn, led to different effects on employment and earn-
ings.  The survey data allowed us to estimate program effects on a
range of other outcomes, such as household composition and marital
status.  MFIP’s effects on these selected outcomes for both regions are
shown in Table 10.4.  In general, the impact was similar in urban and
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rural counties.  For example, MFIP generally had no effect on house-
hold composition or sources of household income for recipients in both
urban and rural counties, except that rural recipients were more likely
to report some earnings in the month prior to the survey.  This finding is
somewhat inconsistent with employment effects (shown in Figure
10.1) found from administrative records data.  However, although
MFIP’s effects on marital status were not significant for urban and rural
recipients, a larger proportion of rural recipients were married at 36
months compared with urban recipients. 
MFIP might have had different effects on women who cohabited
or married after random assignment given that they would have less of
a need to work.  (Note that MFIP’s participation mandates require that
only one parent work or participate in services, and either parent can
fill this requirement.)  In fact, for two-parent families, MFIP did not af-
fect the likelihood that at least one parent was employed, but it did de-
crease the likelihood that both parents worked; in other words, at least
one parent cut back his or her work effort (Miller et al. 2000).  Fur-
thermore, results from the Negative Income Tax experiments and,
more recently, from research on the Earned Income Tax Credit show
that married women reduced their labor supply more, relative to sin-
gle women, in response to extra financial benefits (Munnell 1986; Eis-
sa and Hoynes 1998).  Nonexperimental analysis does suggest that
MFIP had larger employment effects for women who were not married
or cohabiting at the time of the survey compared with those who 
were. 
Finally, the differences in program effects across the two areas may
arise from differences in the local environments.  It is not always clear
how the local economy might affect a program’s impact, but perhaps
jobs were more readily available to recipients in urban counties, or per-
haps the types of jobs available in rural and urban areas differed.  Fur-
ther analysis provided some evidence that the local economy alone can-
not explain the differences in MFIP’s effects.  If the local economy
were the primary explanation, then we would expect that most sub-
groups of the population in rural counties would be equally affected by
MFIP.  Instead, we found that MFIP had very different effects on dif-
ferent groups of individuals in rural counties, the most striking being
those defined by prior marital status. 
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CONCLUSION
Unlike patterns in urban areas, caseload declines in rural areas have
not corresponded with increases in employment or reductions in pover-
ty.  Furthermore, the effects of the 1996 welfare reform legislation in
rural versus urban regions are not well understood.  Our study sought to
inform the gap in this research about the role of regional differences in
welfare policy.  In contrast to the large and lasting effects on employ-
ment and earnings in urban counties, the Minnesota Family Investment
Program’s effects on employment faded considerably in the rural coun-
ties by the second year.  Moreover, the program’s effects became nega-
tive in the second year in one of the rural counties. 
We raised several hypotheses to explain this pattern of impacts.
Some of them were able to be tested with these data and some were not.
One hypothesis was that rural recipients differ from their urban coun-
terparts.  The evaluation data show that rural recipient families differ
from their urban counterparts both in terms of demographic character-
istics and in their work experience and attitudes or perceptions about
welfare and work.  In particular, compared with urban recipients, more
of the rural recipients are white, had been previously married, and ap-
peared better prepared to enter the workforce.  Moreover, rural recipi-
ents were more likely to report a sense of stigma associated with re-
ceiving welfare. 
We find that differences in observable characteristics, particularly
prior marital status and work experience, can explain much of MFIP’s
different effects in three of the rural counties.  However, these factors
explain little of the difference in the one remaining rural county.  The
different effects in this county may be due to the local economy, or
other aspects particular to that county, or to unobservable differences
in characteristics between its recipients and other recipients.  The find-
ings in this chapter provide evidence that regional differences play an
important role in mediating the effects of welfare and antipoverty poli-
cies on the employment behavior of welfare recipients, and lend sup-
port to recent efforts to consider regional differences when formulating
these policies.  The current statewide version of MFIP is one example
of such an effort, as counties, rather than the state, are allowed to de-
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termine the length of welfare receipt prior to imposing participation re-
quirements.
Notes
Corresponding author, Lisa Gennetian, MDRC, 16 East 34th Street, New York, New
York, 10016; lisa_gennetian@mdrc.org.  This research was supported by funding from
the Minnesota Department of Human Services, the Ford Foundation, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Charles
Stewart Mott Foundation, the Annie E. Casey Foundation, the McKnight Foundation,
and the Northwest Area Foundation.  Many thanks for helpful comments from Joel
Kvamme, Greg Duncan, Kathy Edin, Virginia Knox, and Bo Beaulieu.
1. STRIDE was operated with funding from the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills
Training (JOBS) program, which was established by the Family Support Act of
1988 and designed to move people from welfare to work through education, train-
ing, and work experience.
2. The FGA program was designed to allow certain types of families to receive cash
assistance who did not qualify for AFDC.  In particular, some two-parent families
who did not qualify for AFDC due to the stringent work history requirements or
the 100 hour per month restriction on working in the AFDC-UP program could
reapply and qualify for the FGA program.  Benefit levels for families that quali-
fied for the FGA program were the same as in AFDC.
3. Throughout this paper, the terms “welfare” and “public assistance” are used to
present the range of benefits that are provided in either the MFIP or AFDC sys-
tems, including MFIP, AFDC, FGA, and Food Stamps.
4. The three urban counties included Hennepin (Minneapolis), Anoka, and Dakota.
The four rural counties included Mille Lacs, Morrison, Sherburne, and Todd.
5. In urban counties, single-parent families could also be randomly assigned to The
MFIP Incentives Only group.  These families were not required to participate in
employment related services.  In Hennepin County (Minneapolis) only, some
families were also randomly assigned to a fourth group, an AFDC/No Services
group.  This group continued to receive assistance under the AFDC system but
was not eligible to receive STRIDE services, to allow an evaluation of the
STRIDE program compared to providing no employment and training services.
6. A small proportion of the AFDC group received cash assistance from the FGA
program instead of AFDC.
7. The survey sample is representative of the full administrative records sample.
Non-response analyses also indicate that random assignment worked; baseline
characteristics of experimental group members are similar to the characteristics of
control group members (see Miller et al. 2000).
8. The sample sizes do not reflect the composition of the caseload in the seven coun-
ties, because only a fraction of the caseload in the three urban counties was in-
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cluded in the evaluation.  In the rural counties, in contrast, the entire caseload was
randomly assigned to either the MFIP or AFDC research groups.
9. Over 95 percent of the sample is female.
10. All impacts are tested for statistical significance. Only those impacts that are sta-
tistically significant using a two-tailed t-test at the 10 percent level are deemed
program impacts.  Significance tests are based on the fact that some estimated im-
pacts, or differences between the groups, may arise solely by chance or random
variation.  Impacts that are statistically significant can be thought of, with a rea-
sonable degree of confidence, as representing a true difference between the
groups, rather than a difference arising by chance.
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